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Adequacy of the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property in 
Complex High-Tech Markets 
by 
Clovia Hamilton* 
In 1995, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
adopted new guidelines for those wishing to license intellectual property 
rights without violating antitrust laws. Designed to provide clarity, these 
guidelines instead breed confusion because they misunderstand the nature of 
intellectual property markets and provide insufficient guidance in the most 
difficult areas. Section I of this article will discuss the basic provisions of the 
guidelines, especially their treatment of "innovation markets." It argues that 
government enforcers should focus primarily on activity that creates entry 
barriers. Understanding the use and misuse of licensing is the key to analyz-
ing barriers in the IP field. The remainder of the article therefore examines 
three common types of license misuse. Section II considers patent holders' 
potential liability for refusing to grant licenses to competitors. Section III 
looks at the effect of setting industry standards and at patent holders' miscon-
duct during industry standard setting. Section N analyzes patent accumula-
tion through devices such as pooling and cross-licensing. The article 
concludes that the government should further amend the Guidelines to pro-
vide clearer rules for use of IP licenses. 
I . INTRODUCTION 
A. The IP Guidelines Generally 
The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property 
(the "IP Guidelines") state the antitrust enforcement policy of the Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") with 
respect to the licensing of intellectual property protected by patent, copy-
right, trade secret, and know-how. 1 The IP Guidelines replaced the 1988 IP 
Guidelines as a general policy statement designed to assist those who need to 
predict whether the Agencies will challenge a practice as anticompetitive.2 
The 1988 IP Guidelines were drafted during the Reagan Administration 
when Associate Attorney General William Baxter, one of the most important 
* 
1. 
2. 
J..D., John Marshall; B.S. Civil Engineering and LL.M., University of Illinois. 
Member, Georgia Bar and registered to practice before the US PTO. Director 
of Intellectual Property and Research Compliance, and Assistant Professor, Old 
Dominion University. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of 
the author. This paper is based in part on the author's thesis written to fulfill the 
requirements of the LL.M. program at the University of Illinois. 
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR 
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.0 (April 1995). 
Id. 
24 Computer law Review and Technology Journal [Vol. VII 
people in the patent reforms, was at the DOJ.3 Baxter was an advocate of free 
market economics and cut back the DOJ's antitrust section.4 Although 
Republicans have advocated that markets are likely to be self-correcting if a 
single firm reaches a dominant position, thereby reducing the need for gov-
ernment intervention, the decline in antitrust enforcement during the Reagan 
administration was unexpectect.s 
The 1995 IP Guidelines, however, were drafted during the Clinton Ad-
ministration. The different antitrust philosophies between the Reagan and 
Clinton Administrations created an expectation of substantial change from 
the 1988 IP Guidelines to the 1995 version.6 Contrary to these expectations, 
the 1995 IP Guidelines brought about minimal change.? 
The DOJ and FfC (the "Agencies") will apply the IP Guidelines and 
continue to assess the legality of most intellectual property license restraints 
under the "rule of reason."s The rule of reason is a balancing test whereby a 
plaintiff must prove that anticompetitive effects outweigh pro-competitive ef-
fects.9 First, the restraint on trade created by a license, or lack thereof, is-
identified.10 Next, the Jicensing restraint is evaluated to determine whether it 
is reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive benefits that outweigh 
any anticompetitive effects. 11 The rule of reason analysis is applied rather 
than a per se analysis because licenses are often efficiency-enhancing in that, 
without licenses, intellectual property cannot be used or would cost more to 
the user.12 
In addition, the 1995 IP Guidelines define a new antitrust safety zone 
within which the Agencies will not challenge a licensing agreement re-
straint. n This safety zone applies to restraints that do not warrant per se 
treatment, and to licenses in which "the licensor and its licensees collectively 
3. Yoshitake Kihara, U.S. Pro-Patent Policy: A Review of the Last 20 Yearsr 
CASRIP NEWSLETTER 13-14 (Winter 2000). 
4. Id. at 13. 
5. Small Shift in Antitrust Policy Likely, NEMA Publications (Mar. 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.nema.org/publications/ei/marO l /smallshift.htm. 
6. Ronald Katz, Recent Cases Reveal Gaps in Draft Antitrust/IP Guidelines, 
Coudert Brothers (November 1994), available at http://www.coudert.com/prac-
tice/gapanti .htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2002). 
7. Id. 
8. See GutDELINES, supra note l, at § 3.4. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at § 4.3. 
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account for no more than twenty percent of each relevant market signifi-
cantly affected by the restraint." 14 
Further, the IP Guidelines define three different relevant markets.is The 
first is the traditional market for goods and services produced using intellec-
tual property .16 Second, intellectual property agreements can have an impact 
on the technology market itself.n The scope of this technology market will 
be determined by evaluating other technologies that buyers could substitute 
at a cost comparable to that of using the licensed technology. 1s Thus, gener-
ally, a technology market is the actual intellectual property being licensed to 
a manufacturer of an end product, including any technology that is a close 
substitute. 19 A third market is the new innovation market.20 
B. The New Innovation Market 
The innovation market concept stemmed in part from the 1984 National 
Cooperative Research Act ("NCRA"),21 in which Congress endorsed the idea 
that firms compete in innovation markets and lowered the antitrust liability of· 
certain joint ventures.22 The concept of innovation markets also stemmed in 
part from the D.C. Circuit ruling in FTC v. PPG Industries, Inc., which 
blocked the merger of two of the world's four largest manufacturers of air-
plane windows and windshields.23 In 1986, the court in PPG held that merger 
law "rests upon the theory that, where rivals are few, firms will be able to 
coordinate their behavior, either by overt collusion or implicit understanding, 
in order to restrict output and achieve profits above competitive levels."24 
Nine years later, consistent with PPG's involvement of "four" manufactur-
ers, the 1995 IP Guidelines stated that absent credible market share data, the 
Agencies will not challenge a licensing restraint if there are four or more 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at § 3.2. 
16. Id. at§ 3.2.1. (describing "Goods markets"). 
17. Id. at § 3.2.2. (describing ''Technology markets"). 
18. Id. 
19-. See Azam Aziz, Defining Technology and Innovation Markets: The DOJ's An-
titrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 475, 485 (1995). 
20. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at § 3.2.3. 
21. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 4301 (2000). 
22. Lawrence Landman, Competitiveness, Innovation Policy, and the Innovation 
Market Myth: A Reply to Tom and Newberg on Innovation Markets as the 
"Centerpiece" of "New Thinking" on Innovation, 13 ST. JoHN'S J.L. COMM. 
223, 236 (1998). 
23. See FfC v. PPG Industries, Inc., 798 F.2d 1500, 1502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
24. Id. at 1503. 
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independent firms with substitutable technology.25 Further, in an innovation 
market, the Agencies will not challenge a licensing restraint if there are four 
or more independent firms with comparable research and development 
capabilities.26 
According to the IP Guidelines, the innovation market share is to be 
determined by measuring the share of research and development expendi-
tures of each participant.27 This approach, however, does not work well be-
cause more research and development is not necessarily better than less 
research and development, and there is no functional relationship between 
the level of research and development expenditure and the level of innova-
tion at the market leve1.2s 
In order to determine the relevant research and development market, the 
Agencies will consider: ( 1) the nature of the product and the ability or will-
ingness of its users to substitute other products for it; (2) the way in which 
geographic location bears on the substitutability of alternatives; and (3) the 
• likelihood of a new firm entering the research and development market.21> 
Unfortunately, the relevant market definition approach does not provide ade-
quate direction in analyzing high-technology cases in industries such as com-
puter hardware and software, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
biotechnology, communications, and defense. 
Innovation markets are defined by the Agencies only when the capabil-
ity to engage in research and development can be associated with specialized 
assets or characteristics of specific firms that can be reasonably identified.30 
Besides facilities, equipment, or patents held, a research and development 
organization's true research capabilities, or specialized assets, are its unique 
intellectual capital; in other words, their researchers' knowledge base. It will 
be difficult for any one person or firm to define or dominate such a market. 
Thus, practitioners argue, there cou[d be no precision or accuracy in the pro-
cess of defining an innovation market because market shares and levels of 
market concentration could not be determined.31 
Practitioners argue that it is very difficult to define the relevant product 
and location for high-tech innovations because such innovations are gener-
25. See GumELINES, supra note 1, at § 3.2.3 (Example 4). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. See also Landman, supra note 22, at 237. 
28. Richard Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to 
Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 33 (1995). 
29. Id. at 40. 
30. See GUIDELINES, supra note 1, at § 3.2.3. 
31. Janet McDavid, Mergers 1995, Statement before the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Ill. 7, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/129941.htm (last visited 
July 29, 2001). 
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ally not actual, identifiable end products.32 The new innovation markets are 
markets for pure research and development unrelated to the licensing of a 
good or product. These markets are related to knowledge and embryonic re-
search findings.33 For high-technology, end products may not possess the im-
portance of valuable and marketable intellectual capital, intermediate ideas, 
tools, and prototypes.34 Therefore, innovation markets have been called theo-
retical markets in which companies compete to develop products that do not 
currently exist.35 For example, "[m]uch current biotechnology commerciali-
zation activity is focused not on end-products ... but on intermediates or 
tools that are a step on the way to the final product."36 
In addition, the principal problem associated with market definition is 
determining which of the existing firms and potential competitors have suffi-
cient restraining influence on a defendant's power over price to warrant their 
inclusion in the relevant market.37 In the high-tech sector, market definition 
is more complex. The issue of whether products are reasonably interchangea-
ble may be problematic. If products can be interchangeable as close substi-
tutes, they belong in the same market. For example, hardware and operating 
system software are functionally dependent on one another but are viewed as 
two separate markets. 
The difficulty of defining markets is illustrated by the DOJ' s attempt to 
regulate innovation competition by requiring Microsoft to sell its Internet 
Explorer as a separate product from its Windows operating system.38 In 
1990, the FTC began an investigation into Microsoft's licensing practices, 
which was subsequently taken over by the DOJ in 1993.39 In 1994, the DOJ 
filed a complaint against Microsoft and a motion to approve a consent de-
cree. 40 The resulting 1995 consent decree challenged various contractual pro-
3-2. See Azi.z, supra note 19, at 500. 
33. Dominic Bencivenga, An Innovative Theory Impact Seen in Clash of Patent, 
Antitrust Law, 220 N.Y. L.J. 6 (1998). 
34. Id. 
35. Nicholas A. Widnell, The Crystal Ball of Innovation Market Analysis in 
Merger Review: An Appropriate Means of Predicting the Future?, 4 GEO. MA-
SON L. R.Ev. 369, 370 (1996). 
36. Stephen Johnson, Biotech Licensor Should Know Misuse Doctrine, 20 NAT'L 
L.J. 43 (1998). 
37. MILTON HANDLER, Er AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 152 
(4th ed. 1997). 
38. Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Intellectual Property and Antitrust 
Limitations on Contract, Mercatus Center Symposium on Dynamic Competi-
tion and Public Policy, 22 (2000), available at http://www.gmu.edu/depart 
ments/law/faculty/papers/chronology.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2002). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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visions, and the DOJ suggested that Microsoft's licensing practices created or 
supported entry barriers arising from the existence of network externalities 
and compatibility problems that harmed its rivals.41 In 1997, the DOJ sought 
to have Microsoft held in contempt for violating the 1995 consent decree by 
tying its Windows 95 to the Internet Explorer browser.42 In 1998, Microsoft 
won its argument that the decree allowed it to integrate these two products.43 
Opponents argued that, by controlling the browser market, Microsoft was 
attempting to monopolize the operating systems market.44 
Practitioners complain that innovation markets are mythical and diffi-
cult to define clearly, because they dilute the traditional practice of projecting 
a future goods market.45 Instead, innovation markets can easily be defined in 
terms of the products and services with which they are associated.46 This 
approach has been advocated for technology markets.41 Thus, there is no 
need to confuse parties by forcing them to consider the innovation market in 
addition to the associated traditional goods market. 
For instance, research and development efforts are often joint ventures, 
which are analogous to, or fall just short of, mergers.48 Thus, innovation has 
always been a concern in merger analyses.49 In 1999, the DOJ's Director of 
Operations and Merger Enforcement, Constance K. Robinson, stated that the 
first step in a merger innovation analysis is to determine the likely source of 
innovation.50 Ms. Robinson advised practitioners that knowing the source is 
required in order to understand what drives the innovation. Further, the cus-
tomers, the suppliers, and the collaborators as well as the research and devel-
opment strategy will define the source of innovation.s 1 But these facts are no 
different from the facts researched in a traditional goods or services market 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 24. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 25. 
45. See Landman, supra note 22, at 241. 
46. Aziz, supra note 19, at 500. 
47. Id: 
48. COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 436, available 
at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/-ota/disk3/1984/8407 _n.html (last visited 
Aug. I 0, 2002). 
49. George A. Hay, Innovations in Antitrust Enforcement, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 7, 9 
(1995). 
50. See Constance K. Robinson, Leap-Frog and Other Fonns of Innovation: Pro-
tecting the Future for High-Tech and Emerging Industries Through Merger En-
forcement, Address Before the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois 
(June 10, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/2482. 
htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2002). 
51. See id. 
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analysis. The contributors, customers, suppliers, and research history would 
not change. They would simply be secondary considerations to shed light on 
the source that drives the product or service. 
Further, Ms. Robinson discussed the Halliburton/Dresser merger as an 
example of how the merger innovation analysis works.s2 Looking for the 
source of innovation, the DOJ concluded that there was no single innovator 
among the research group, and that the research organizations had different 
strategies or approaches to research and development.s3 This is not a very 
profound or influential finding. It is likely that the Agencies will have 
enough ammunition to challenge an intellectual property license restraint 
with the result of a standard goods market analysis, regardless of its effect on 
the source of innovation. Focusing on the sources of innovation and on re-
search and development expenditures only serves to decrease the predictabil-
ity of antitrust enforcement in the licensing of intellectual property. 
In fact, the focus should not be on creating a new market definition for 
innovations. Innovations should merely be associated with the traditional 
market for the end-product line and location, which are the first two basic 
considerations of the relevant market definition. Rather, Agency guidance 
should focus on the third market definition consideration-conduct in the 
high-tech arena that creates potential entry barriers. Licensing is a key phase 
of market entry for the development of innovative products and services.54 
C. Identifying Entry Barriers 
In merger analyses, the main mitigating factor is the potential for en-
try .55 "If entry barriers are low, then it is unlikely that market power, whether 
individually or collectively exercised, will persist for long since high profits 
will prompt new firms to enter the market."56 The likelihood of a new firm 
entering the high-technology research and development market depends on 
the expense to the newcomer.s7 Expenses include equipment, facilities, 
skilled personnel, and marketing. There are also expenses incurred from in-
tellectual property licensing and/or sales efforts. 
The FTC utilizes this analysis. In January 1996, FTC's Commissioner 
Mary Azcuenaga stated: 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See U.S. DEP'T OF JusncE AND FED. TRADE CoMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (1992) § 3.1, reprinted in 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) CJ[ 13, 104, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmgl.html 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2002). 
55. Ilene Knable Gotts, The "Innovation Market": Competitive Fact or Regulatory 
Fantasy?, 44 No. 1 THE PRACTICAL LAWYER 79, 84· (1998). 
56. Id. 
57. HANDLER, supra note 37, at 153. 
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[c]ompetition in true innovation or pure research ... poses an 
entirely new set of challenges for antitrust enforcers, such as iden-
tifying barriers to entry into research, as distinguished from entry 
into a product line. The Commission has not yet ventured far into 
this difficult terrain, and I rather doubt that it will in the next few 
years.58 
Thus, identifying entry barriers is a new challenge for high-tech innova-
tions. In fact, in the research and development cases brought by the Agen-
cies, entry barriers were substantial because the secret nature of research may 
have increased the cost of strategic planning for research and resource arroca-
tion. It may also have been difficult to ascertain customer needs via market 
research, and there may have been costly regulatory approval processes to 
overcome. Finally, proprietary intellectual property rights may have blocked 
the path.59 With respect to proprietary intellectual property rights, licensing 
provides the key to market entry.60 Thus, the remainder of this article ad-
dresses the potential barriers involving high-tech licensing, such as refusing 
to license, misconduct related to industry standards setting, and the problem 
of patent pooling. 
Il. REFUSING TO LICENSE 
Refusing to license a patent can sometimes constitute improper exclu-
sionary conduct. In a 1992 case, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court considered the unilateral refusal to sell or 
license a patented or copyrighted product and tying arrangements.61 Although 
Section 5.3 of the 1995 IP Guidelines cites Eastman Kodak,62 the Guidelines 
do not provide much guidance in the area of exclusionary conduct.63 Section 
5.5 of the IP Guidelines states that exclusion from a licensing arrangement 
among competing technologies is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects 
"unless (l) excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the relevant market 
for the good incorporating the licensed technologies and (2) the pool partici-
pants collectively possess market power in the relevant market."64 If these 
circumstances exist, the Agencies will evaluate whether the arrangement's 
58. Mary Azcuenaga, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Association (January 24, 1996), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
speeches/azcuenaga/intelp.htm (last visited Sept 14, 2002). 
59. See Thomas N. Dahdouh, The Shape of Things to Come: Innovation Market 
Analysis in Merger Cases, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 405, 434-35 ( 1995). 
60. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GumEUNES, supra note 54. 
61. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 459-62 
(1992). 
62. GUIDELINES, supra note I, at § 5.3. 
63. See id. at § 5.4. 
64. Id. at § 5.5. 
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limitations on participation are reasonably related to exploiting and develop-
ing the pooled technologies, and will assess the net effect of those limitations 
in the relevant market.65 The IP Guidelines do not provide adequate guidance 
for determining whether and when refusing to license or sell patented tech-
nology or copyrighted work is justified as a legitimate business decision. The 
IP Guidelines merely state that the Agencies will determine whether a licens-
ing restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve pro-competitive efficien-
cies.66 And specific examples of pro-competitive efficiencies or business 
justifications are not provided. 
In Eastman Kodak, Kodak took exclusionary action by implementing a 
policy to stop selling its replacement parts to Independent Service Operators 
("ISOs"), and by securing agreements with other parts manufacturers not to 
sell parts to ISOs.67 The ISOs alleged that Kodak's new policy of selling 
replacement parts only to Kodak machine owners that purchased Kodak's 
repair services constituted both monopolization and attempted monopoliza-
tion of the market for Kodak repair services under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act and a per se illegal tying arrangement under Section l.6S 
Kodak proffered three business justifications for its restrictive parts pol-
icy: (1) it wanted to guard against inadequate service to its customers be-
cause of its commitment to quality service; (2) it needed to control and lower 
its inventory costs; and (3) it desired to prevent the ISOs from free-riding on 
its capital investment in its equipment industry.69 The Supreme Court held 
that these reasons were insufficient and pre-textual and that the proffered 
business justifications really did not play a part in Kodak's decision to imple-
ment this policy to refuse to sell or license. 70 
There was evidence that Kodak had control over the availability of 
parts, resulting in excluded service competition, increased service prices, and 
forced unwilling consumption of Kodak service.11 The Court determined that 
Kodak controlled approximately 100% of the single brand parts market and 
80 to 95% of the service market with no readily available substitutes.n In 
Eastman Kodak, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Times-Picayune principle 
that power gained naturally from a patent or copyright .can give rise to anti-
65. Id. 
66. Id. at § 4.2. 
67. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 458. 
68. Id. at 459. 
69. Id. at 461. 
70. See id. at 483-84. 
71. See id. at 464-65. 
72. Id. at 481. 
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trust liability if a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to ex-
pand his empire into the next.73 
After the Supreme Court remanded Eastman Kodak, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the trial court's jury verdict in favor of the ISOs.74 Thus, refusal to 
deal in the complex high-tech market for photocopier and micrographics 
equipment, and its derivative aftermarket, proved detrimental to Kodak. Ko-
dak was required to sell all of its patented parts to ISOs for a period of ten 
years and, after trebling damages, the ISOs obtained a judgment of $71.8 
million.75 The Ninth Circuit held that "[u]nlike the other cases involving re-
fusals to license patents, this case concerns a blanket refusal that included 
protected and unprotected products."76 The presumption that refusing to li-
cense or sell is justified by legitimate business reasons may be rebutted by 
evidence that the monopolist acquired the intellectual property unlawfully, 
attempted to gain a monopoly beyond the grant of a patent, or relied on a 
pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.77 Here, 
there was evidence that the proffered business justification really did not play 
a part in the decision to act.78 Kodak's parts manager testified that patent 
rights did not cross his mind at the time the policy to exclude ISOs was 
implemented. 19 
Kodak held patents for over 220 parts needed to service its 
photocopiers.so Before Eastman Kodak, no court had ever compelled a paten-
tee to license a valid patent, as doing so imposed antitrust liability on a paten-
tee for refusing to license.s1 The significance of a monopolist's unilateral 
refusal to sell or license a patented or copyrighted product in the context of a 
Section 2 claim based on monopoly leveraging was a question of first im-
pression.s2 In fact, the DOJ had not filed a Section 2 case, nor said much 
73. See id. at 479 n.29 (quoting Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 
U.S. 594, 611 (1953)). 
74. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1201, 
1228 (9th Cir. 1997). 
75. Id. at 1201, 1227-28. 
76. Id. at 1219. 
77. Id. at 1216, 1219. See also Richard J. Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and 
Entry Deterrence, in STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 205, 
206-207 (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981). 
78. Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1219. 
7'!}. Id. 
80. Id. at 1214. 
81. Tonya Trumm, Expansion of the Compulsory Licensing Doctrine? Image Tech-
nical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 24 J. CoRP. L. 157, 158 (1998). 
82. Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1214. 
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about the issue.83 The Ninth Circuit held that the mere desire to protect intel-
lectual property is not in and of itself a legitimate business justification.s4 
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, has upheld refusals to license as 
proper use of the patent monopoly. In 2000, the court decided CSU v. 
Xerox,85 which arose out of a class action antitrust lawsuit with facts very 
similar to those of Eastman Kodak. In 1984, Xerox established a parts policy 
in which it refused to sell parts to CSU and other IS0s.s6 The district court 
concluded that a monopolist's refusal to license its patented or copyrighted 
product could never give rise to antitrust liability on the ground that such a 
refusal to license is immune from antitrust scrutiny.87 In considering the ef.. 
feet of Xerox's unilateral right to refuse to license copyrighted manuals and 
diagnostic software on liability under the antitrust laws, the Federal Circuit in 
CSU embraced the First Circuit's approach on liability under the antitrust 
laws.ss 
The First Circuit's approach was set out in Data General Corp. v. 
Grumman Systems Support Corp., in which it stated that copyright monopo-
lies are based on Congress' assumption that the right to exclude others cre-
ates a system of incentives that promotes consumer welfare by encouraging 
investment in the creation of expressive work.89 Applying this principle to 
CSU, the Federal Circuit concluded that exclusionary conduct could include 
a monopolist's refusal to license.90 This is presumed to be a legitimate busi-
ness justification; the antitrust plaintiff has the burden to overcome this pre-
sumption.91 The Federal Circuit rejected CSU's invitation to examine 
Xerox's subjective motivation in asserting its right to exclude under the cop-
yright laws for pretext.92 
The Federal Circuit also came to this conclusion in Intergraph Corp. v. 
Intel Corp., in a case arising out of a dispute over Intergraph's Clipper tech-
nology, which it used in high-performance microprocessors.93 To this end, 
the Federal Circuit held that Xerox's refusal to license was "squarely within 
83. Steven Reynolds, Antitrust and Patent Licensing: Cycles of Enforcement and 
Current Policy, 37 JuRIMETRICS J. 129, 147 (1997). 
84. Image Technical Servs., 125 F.3d at 1218-19. 
85: See CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
86. Id. at 1324. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 1329. 
89. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186-87 
(1st Cir. 1994). 
90. See CSU, L.L.C., 203 F.3d at 1327. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 1329. 
93. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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the rights granted by Congress to the copyright holder and did not constitute 
a violation of the antitrust laws" in the absence of definitive rebuttal evi-
dence. Such a rebuttal would include evidence that copyrights were obtained 
by unlawful means or were used to gain monopoly power beyond the statu-
tory copyright grant.94 
The FTC sometimes requires licensing a patent to a potential competitor 
as a condition of merger approval. For example, the FTC challenged the $63 
million merger of phannaceutical companies Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz into 
Novartis in 1996.9s· The FTC was concerned about broadly focused therapeu-
tic markets for four specific products.96 The FTC alleged that the combina-
tion would reduce or suppress research and development because the merged 
firm would have less incentive to license its intellectual property rights to or 
collaborate with others.97 To prevent this from occurring, the FTC required 
the licensing of specified gene therapy technology and patent rights to 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., which would put Rhone in a position to compete 
against the combined firm Novartis.98 Hence, this is an example of compul-
sory licensing as a remedial practice.99 
Rather than helping to alleviate this confusion, the IP Guidelines do not 
provide much guidance on exclusionary conduct in the form of the refusal to 
license or sell intellectual property. The Agencies should provide guidance 
on: (1) what types of business justification arguments are valid; (2) when 
reliance on a business justification is a pretext to mask anticompetitive con-
duct; and (3) how a claim of legitimate business justification can be rebutted 
with evidence that the refusal involved intellectual property that was unlaw-
fully acquired, such as by patent misuse, a combination of protected and 
unprotected products, or a monopoly beyond the grant of a patent or statutory 
copyright grant. 
III. MISCONDUCT DURING STANDARDS-SETTING 
The setting of industry standards can also be anticompetitive. Section 
5.5 of the IP Guidelines, which covers cross-licensing and pooling arrange-
ments, states that a possible anticompetitive effect may occur if participants 
are discouraged from engaging in research and development. 100 For example, 
94. CSU, L.L.C., 203 F.3d at 1329. 
95. See In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 {1997). 
96. See id. at 844-45. 
97. Id. at 85 l. 
98. Id. at 842. 
99. ITC Accord in CIBA Geigy/Sandox Merger to Prevent Slowdown in Gene 
Therapy Development & Preserve Competition in Com Herbicides, Flea-Con-
trol Markets, Press Release, FfC (Dec. 17, 1996), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/opa/1996/9612/ciba.htm. 
100. See Guidelines, supra note 1, at § 5.5. 
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a pooling arrangement requiring members to grant licenses to each other for 
current and future technology at minimal cost may suppress technology by 
reducing the incentive to engage in research and development, because mem-
bers of the pool have to share their successful research and development and 
each of the members can free-ride on the accomplishments of other pool 
members. 101 This may be true of standards-setting organizations that overlap 
to some extent in structure and purpose with joint ventures.102 
As a practical commercial matter, licensees generally want exclusive 
rights to justify the significant effort and expense incurred in exploiting high-
technology. The 1995 IP Guidelines do not specifically address participation 
and conduct in industry standards-setting groups that are prevalent in the 
high-technology arena. The IP Guidelines should have addressed the poten-
tial for monopolies in the development of high-technology standards and in-
terface specifications. Industry standards are agreed upon specifications for 
the production of functionally compatible goods and services and are vital to 
many aspects of the economy, since they may be the only way to ensure that 
technology are compatible with each other. 103 The line between beneficial 
standards and standards used as anticompetitive devices must be made 
clearer. 
A. De facto Standards-Setting 
The two types of standards-setting are de facto and de jure. De facto 
standard-setting occurs when a standard achieves a critical mass and domi-
nates an industry.104 Companies that set de facto industry standards have tre-
mendous economic power in that they can control the interfaces to the 
products for which they set the standard.105 If competitors cannot interface 
with the standard-setting product, then that competitor cannot compete effec-
tively .106 Thus, interfaces may actually define relevant markets.107 Further, 
standards-setting can have anticompetitive effects if it thwarts innovation by 
advocating an older standard when a newer, better, or more widely accepted 
101. Id. 
102. Mark Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. 
REv. 1041, 1094 n.169 (1996). 
103. David Healey, Group Standard-Setting Grows More Significant: De Jure Stan-
dard-Setting Raises Patent Enforceability Issues as well as Antitrust Implica-
tions, 20 NAT'L LJ. 38 at C36 (May 18, 1998). 
104. See Dictionary of PC Hardware and Data (1996), available at http://www. 
oreilly .com. 
105. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of 
Interfaces, 40 J. !Nous. EcoN. 9, 35 (1992). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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technology is available. 108 Standard-setting might also provide a forum for 
collusion, such as selecting a standard designed to preclude the use or accept-
ance of another's product.109 
The personal computer software industry exhibits a particular set of 
conditions known to economists as network effects.I 10 A network effect is 
present when the value of a product or service increases with the cumulative 
number of purchases, and each additional purchase raises the value of the 
product to existing users as well as the expected value of the product to 
future adopters.111 For example, Netscape uses the network effect by not 
charging anything, but increasing the value of its product and itself.112 Net-
work effects permit a market's first entrant to achieve domination of a mar-
ket by getting a head start in building an installed base of users that increase 
the value of that first entrant's product.113 
In November 1995, the FI'C conducted hearings on global and innova-
tion-based competition to consider networks, standards, foreclosure, and stra-
tegic conduct. 114 Robert Kohn of Borland International discussed the 
monopoly in standard interface specifications.' lj Kohn stated that users adopt 
a particular interface standard by investing time and resources in learning 
how to operate the product efficiently.1 16 Users increase this investment by 
purchasing complementary products that are compatible with the interface 
standard of the original product. 117 Ultimately, a market leader in control of 
an interface standard may substantially raise the cost to consumers of switch-
ing to alternative product offerings of subsequent market entrants, and these 
108. David A. Balto, Standard Setting in a Network Economy, Remarks at the Cut-
ting Edge Antitrust Law Seminars International (Feb. 17, 2000) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/standardsetting.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 
2002). 
109. Id. 
I IO. Burtis & Kobayaski, supra note 38. 
111. See Addamax v. Open Software Found., 152 F.3d 48, 50 n.4 (1st Cir. 1998). 
112. John M. Gallaugher & Yu-Ming Wang, Network Effects and the Impact of Free 
Goods: An Analysis of the Web Server Market, 3 INT'L J. OF ELEC. CoM. 67, 88 
(1999). 
113. Id. 
114. See Robert Kohn, Remarks at Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Com-
petition (Nov. 29, 1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/GCll 
2995.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2002). 
115. Id. 
l16. Id. 
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alternative products might actually be better, cheaper, and more 
innovati ve.11 s 
Further, promoting innovation is a function of properly circumscribing 
the scope of intellectual property protection and enforcing antitrust laws to 
prevent monopoly control over interface standards. For example, Microsoft 
controls the desktop computer operating system standard.119 With respect to 
this operating system, Microsoft won a $13.6 million judgment against Stac 
Electronics for the misappropriation of its trade secrets.120 A federal jury 
awarded Stac $120 million for patent infringement and Microsoft the $13.6 
million for trade secret misuse, and required the parties to enter into a broad 
cross-licensing agreemenr.121 
In addition to the potential for a market leader in control of an industry 
standard to raise the cost to consumers, there is also potential for exclusion-
ary conduct. According to Robert Kohn, Stac would be out of business if 
Microsoft refused to license to it.122 Kohn recommended requiring compul-
sory licensing of the source code, subject to a modest royalty that implements 
the interface standard in order to allow competitors to develop complemen-
tary products. 123 Absent such licensing, the users of original software pro-
grams will face switching costs if the software is not allowed to be 
compatible or if follow-on firms are not allowed zero-priced access to de 
facto industry standards. 124 When a competitor so dominates a market by 
becoming the sole standard-setting authority, its power must ):>e carefully 
monitored or actively constrained if innovation in related markets is not to be 
suppressect.12s 
The lengthy legal battle between the Addamax Corporation and the 
Open Software Foundation ("OSF') raised the issue of de facto industry stan-
118. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a 
Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 283, 288 (1996). 
119. See George Willingmyre, International Standards: At the Crossroads, availa-
ble at http://www.gtwassociates.com/answers/international.html (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2002). 
120. See Stac Electronics v. Microsoft Corp., 38 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
121. See Three Significant Court Cases, Software Patent Institute Database of 
Software Technologies, available at http://www.spi.org/3cases.htm (last visited 
Aug. 27, 2002). 
122. Kohn, supra note 114. 
123. Id. 
124. See id. This zero-priced access is compulsory licensing provided for when 
standards can be treated as essential facilities. See Lemley, supra note 102, at 
1091. 
125. See John Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression 
of Technology, available at http://www.econ.utah.edu/les/version_2.0/papers/ 
FlynnAntitrust.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2002). 
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dard-setting. 126 Addamax produced B-1 rated security software systems for 
the computer industry. The OSF is a high-tech joint research and develop-
ment venture registered under the National Cooperative Research and Pro-
duction Act of 1984.121 Eight computer manufacturers established the OSF in 
1988, including Hewlett-Packard and Digital, to conduct computer interface 
research and experimentation and to produce and promote a software alterna-
tive to the UNIX operating system.12s 
Addamax lost a bid for the development of OSF' s security software and 
alleged that OSF' s conduct with respect to its de facto industry standards had 
an anticompetitive impact on the industry because OSF aIIegedly conspired 
to force the price for security software down below the free-market level, 
limiting Addamax's ability to compete. 129 The courts did not explore the 
market issue, but examined the causal connection between Addamax's busi-
ness and OSF's alleged monopsony power.13o The courts held that antitrust 
violations were not the material cause of Addamax's business failure because 
the security software market is a high-risk business and Addamax's product 
was too expensive and complex.131 
Had OSF' s selection of a security software platform been viewed as a 
desire to set a de facto industry standard, as opposed to merely selecting the 
lowest bidder, OSF's selection could have been considered an anticompeti-
tive means to preclude the use or acceptance of Addamax's product. The 
FTC, however, has stated that OSF's actions seemed innocently consistent 
with competitive rivalry; moreover, OSF's actions were mitigated by the fact 
that the joint venture was designed to counter AT&T/Sun's alleged attempts 
to dominate the industry with the UNIX operating system.m Given the 
courts' holdings that all high-tech software business deals are risky, and the 
FTC's view that this is merely a case of competitive rivalry, Addamax did 
not have a chance to prevail. 
B. De jure Standards-Setting 
De jure standards-setting occurs when an industry group or consortia 
adopts standards. 133 For example, in February 1992, Dell Computer Corpora-
tion joined the Video Electronics Standards Association ("VESA"), which is 
composed of all of the major US computer hardware and software manufac-
126. See Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., 888 F. Supp. 274,277 (D. Mass. 
1995). 
127. Id. at 277 n.3. 
128. Id. at 277. 
129. Id. at 278. 
130. See Addamax v. Open Software Found., 152 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 1998). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
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turers.134 In August 1992, VESA adopted a final standard for a computer bus 
design, the VL-bus, for transferring instructions between a computer's cen-
tral processing unit and peripherals. 135 In line with the common practice of de 
Jure industry standard-setting organizations, VESA required that participants 
disclose their intellectual property rights to one another, and Dell representa-
tives certified on several occasions that the VESA proposal did not infringe 
on any of their patents. m 
After the VESA VL-bus design was adopted and incorporated into over 
one million computers, Dell revealed that it obtained a VL-bus patent in 
1991, and announced that it intended to enforce the patent by requiring patent 
licenses from users of its design. 137 In 1995, the FfC charged Dell with vio-
lating Section 5 of the FfC Act, which covers unfair methods of competition, 
because of its failure to disclose its patents during open-standards delibera-
tions.1Js The FfC complained that Dell's actions unreasonably restrained 
competition by hindering the industry's acceptance of the VL-bus design 
standard, raising the costs of implementing the standard, and chilling the 
willingness to participate in future standard-setting activities.!)? Dell subse-
quently signed a consent decree with the FfC that prohibited the company 
from enforcing any of the patents it failed to disclose to the standards group 
for ten years.140 
Hitachi recently cited the 1996 FfC case against Dell when it alleged 
that Rambus violated the rules of the standards-setting body called Joint 
Electron Devices Engineering Council ("JEDEC").141 Hitachi alleged that 
Rambus tried to restrain trade by refusing to reveal its patent enforcement 
intentions during open standards-setting discussions in the early 1990s.142 
Rambus has enforced its proprietary Synchronous DRAM (S-DRAM) by 
forcing memory chipmakers to pay royalties. 143 Although Hitachi has argued 
that Rambus's technology is an open industry standard, Samsung Electronics, 
Oki Electric Industry, Elpida Memory,· Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, and 
134. Dell Computer Corp.; Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid Public Com-
ment, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,870, 57,872 (Nov. 22, 1995). 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
1.40. Id. at 57 ,870-71. 
141. Jack Robertson, DRAM Industry Considers Antitrust Action, ELECTRONIC 
BuYER's NEws, at http:www.ebnews.com/story/0EG20000710S0028, July 10, 
2000. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
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Hitachi all agreed to license the patents and pay Rambus royalties.144 Hy-
undai Electronics Industries, Micron technology, and Infineon Technologies 
sued Rambus on this issue.145 
In addition to utilizing compulsory licensing as a remedial measure for 
misconduct during the standards-setting process, courts may impose an "im-
plied license." For example, in a 1997 decision, Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., the Federal Circuit found that Wang's 
conduct in an industry standards-setting group gave rise to a perpetual, roy-
alty-free implied license to Mitsubishi.146 Wang developed a computer mem-
ory product in 1983 and promoted it as an industry standard through 
JEDEC. 147 Because Wang encouraged Mitsubishi to make and promote the 
product, the Federal Circuit held that Mitsubishi's support for the Wang stan-
dard was part of the consideration to support an implied license.14s 
In conclusion, misconduct includes both encouraging participants in a 
standards-setting process to make and promote a product and refusing to re-
veal patent enforcement intentions during open standards-setting discussions 
(while later enforcing intellectual property rights against the participants). A 
remedial measure is compulsory, or implied, licensing. The increase in legal 
actions against the manipulation of the standards-setting process is evidence 
that the Agencies should have provided guidance on this matter in their IP 
Guidelines. This issue is at least on the Agencies' radar screens because in 
2000, the Assistant Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition advised that 
standards should not overreach, should not restrict or define the product more 
than necessary, should not be applied to just members, but to nonmembers as 
well, and should not do anything to stifle innovation.149 
IV. PROBLEM OF PATENT ACCUMULATION 
"[C]ross-licensing, package licenses or patent pools are created to en-
able all participants to use the intellectual property where, without the li-
censes, perhaps none could do so because of possible or probable 
infringement."1so The IP Guidelines state that the joint marketing of pooled 
intellectual property with collective price setting or coordinated output re-
144. Mitsubishi Signs License Agreement with Rambus, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan .. 2, 
2001. 
145. Korea Hyunani Elec Adds Plaintiffs to Rambus Lawsuit, REUTERS, Oct. 19, 
2000. . 
146. Wang Laboratories Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., 103 F.3d 
1571, 1573 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 522 U.S. 818 (1997). 
147. Id. at 1573. 
148. Id. at 1580. 
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150. Robert A. McTamaney, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Rights: The Devil is 
in the Details, 219 N.Y. L.J. 21 (1998). 
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strictions may have anticompetitive effects. 151 The IP Guidelines, however, 
do not adequately address the entry barrier problem of acquiring broader pro-
tection for narrow inventions and the combination of patent rights by cross-
licensing.152 Practitioners must look elsewhere for guidance, and the DOJ 
Business Review Letters are helpful. 
For example, in December 1998, pursuant to the DOJ Business Review 
Procedure,153 the DOJ provided a statement of its enforcement intentions 
with respect to a proposed arrangement in which Koninklijke Philips Elec-
tronics would assemble, offer a package license, and distribute royalty in-
come under Philips, Sony, and Pioneer Electronic patents.1s4 Allegedly, the 
patents are essential to the manufacturing of Digital Versatile Discs 
("DVDs") and players in compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVD-Video 
formats.1 55 Essential patents have no substitutes and must be licensed in order 
to comply with standard specifications.1s6 
The DOJ stated that by reducing what would otherwise be three licens-
ing transactions into one, the pool would reduce transaction costs for licen-
sors and licensees alike. 1s7 Also, "[b]y ensuring that each Licensor's patents 
will not be blocked by those of the other two, the pool would enhance the 
value of all three Licensors' patents."158 The DOJ concluded that the pro-
posed arrangement is not likely to initiate antitrust enforcement action 
against the proposed cross-license because the combination would lower 
costs to manufacturers that need access to the essential patents in order to 
produce discs and players in conformity with the DVD-Video and DVD-
ROM formats.1s9 
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Another example is a 1999 DOJ statement of its enforcement intentions 
with respect to a proposed arrangement whereby the Toshiba Corporation 
would assemble and offer a package license with Hitachi, Matsushita Electri-
cal Industrial, Mitsubishi Electric, and Time Warner for DVD-Rom and 
DVD-Video formats. 160 Again, the DOJ concluded that the proposed arrange-
ment was not likely to initiate antitrust enforcement action against the pro-
posed cross-license because the combination would lower the costs of 
manufacturers that need access to essential patents in order to produce con-
forming products.161 
Conceptually, the problem of patent accumulation is indistinguishable 
from the merger problem under antitrust law. 162 In the merger analysis, com-
binations and collusions eliminate competition from competing patents that 
would drive royalty rates down to the point at which each patentee could 
hope to charge a royalty that merely reflected the degree to which its patent 
was more valuable than others. 163 As with competing patents, there is a sig-
nificant danger that the cross-licensing of complementary patents will mask 
price fixing conspiracies.164 
The cross-licensing of intellectual property rights is sometimes the prod-
uct of the settlement of an infringement suits. Settlements can be an efficient 
means to avoid litigation and, in general, courts favor settlements. 165 They 
are not, however, immune from antitrust scrutiny. The IP Guidelines provide 
that when cross-licensing involves horizontal competitors, the Agencies wilt 
consider whether the effect of the settlement is to diminish competition 
among parties that would have been actual or likely competitors in a relevant 
market in the absence of the cross-Iicense.166 "In the absence of offsetting 
efficiencies, such settlements may be challenged as unlawful restraints of 
trade." 167 Examples of offsetting efficiencies include the anticipated lower 
manufacturing costs cited in the aforementioned DOJ business review letters, 
and the decision by the owner of weaker patents to license them only as a 
package since they might be more valuable and productive as a packaged 
license.16s 
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In 1997, the DOJ suggested that it is likely to scrutinize patent cross-
licenses and settlements of infringement suits to a greater degree. 169 The DOJ 
proposed a notification procedure to enable it to investigate significant cross-
licenses, licenses in general, and patent infringement suit settlement agree-
ments.170 Joel Klein, the Acting Assistant Attorney General at the time, stated 
that cross-licenses had previously remained largely off the DOJ's agenda.m 
Perhaps this is why the discussion of cross-licensing and settlement agree-
ments is limited in the IP Guidelines. 
Cross-licensing remains largely missing from the DOJ' s agenda. There-
fore, there is a need for more guidance on the entry barrier problem of gain-
ing broad protection for narrow inventions, combining patents and/or other 
intellectual property, by cross-licensing, using cross-licensing to mask price 
fixing conspiracies, or using settlement agreements to diminish competition. 
According to DOJ Business Review Letters, legitimate transactions include 
those that prevent blocked patents, enhance patent value, and lower costs to 
manufacturers that need access to-essential patents. In 1981, a former Deputy 
Attorney General for Economics advised that the DOJ should bring an anti~ 
trust action when a company with a dominant position enters into extensive 
cross-licenses with competitors and the licenses featured restrictions on the 
availability of licenses to new entrants. 172 Thus, practitioners would benefit 
greatly from a thorough discussion of legitimate and insufficient transactions 
in the IP Guidelines. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Innovation is encouraged and is necessary for the economic growth of 
nations, and the obvious solution to defining innovation markets is simply to 
define relevant innovations in terms of the traditional goods and services 
markets associated with the licensed innovations. Agency focus should not 
be on creating a new market definition for innovations. Innovations should 
merely be associated with the traditional market for the end-product line and 
location, which are the first two basic considerations of the relevant market 
definition. Since licensing is a key phase of market entry for the development 
of innovative products and services, 173 Agency guidance should focus on 
conduct in the high-tech arena that constitutes a potential entry barrier. Key 
high-tech entry barriers include refusals to license, misconduct during stan-
dards-setting activities, and patent accumulation methods such as cross-Ii-
169. See Joel Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, Remarks at the Meeting of 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (May 2, 1997), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/l 123.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 
2002). 
170. Id. at 17. 
171. Id. at 3. 
I 72. See Reynolds, supra note 83, at 147. 
173. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GumELINES, supra note 54. 
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censing, package licensing, and patent pools. These activities merit closer 
attention and practitioners need better guidance from the Agencies. 
